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ABSTRACT
Taiwan’s 2016 elections featured intense competition between its
smaller political parties.  A record 18 parties contested the party list
vote. This study examines how to explain the impact of these small
parties in this election. Thus it is interested not only in those small
parties that did make a breakthrough but also why others, despite
running well organized and funded campaigns, were unable to enter
parliament. The paper applied a framework proposed by Lucardie to
explain the impact of small parties in Taiwan’s 2016 elections. In
other words, I examined the small parties’ political project, resources
and political opportunity structure to understand their electoral
fortunes.
Keywords: Small parties, new parties, Taiwan, party politics
On 16 January 2016 Taiwan held combined presidential and parliamen-
tary elections for the second time. Four years earlier the experiment of com-
bining the two elections clearly reduced campaign costs but also meant that
the presidential election completely overshadowed the 2012 parliamentary
contest.1 In contrast, in 2016 even after the Kuomintang (KMT) changed
presidential candidates, the party was unable to narrow the Democratic Pro-
gressive Party (DPP) candidate, Tsai Ing-wen’s commanding lead in the polls.
This meant that the media gave much greater attention to the parliamentary
election. The 2016 parliamentary election campaign was historic as it saw the
most serious attempt by alternative parties that are not splinters from the two
mainstream parties to make a parliamentary breakthrough since 1991. More-
over, one such alternative party, the New Power Party (NPP) won five seats
and become Taiwan’s third largest party.
Following the lifting of martial law and legalization of opposition party
formation in the late 1980s a large number of parties were established. Some
of these new parties did not centre their appeals on national identity but
* Dafydd Fell is the Reader in Comparative Politics with special reference to Taiwan at the
Department of Politics and International Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies
(SOAS), University of London. He is also the Director of the SOAS Centre of Taiwan Studies
and the Editor of the Routledge Research on Taiwan book series. His email address is
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1 For a discussion of the 2012 elections see Gunter Schubert, “No Winds of Change: Tai-
wan’s 2012 National Elections and the Post-Election Fallout,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 41,
no. 3 (2012): 143-161.
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instead could be categorised as leftist parties.2 However, the party system ini-
tially was dominated by the ruling KMT and the main opposition party, the
DPP. The party scene during the January 2016 national elections showed an
interesting parallel to 1991, when Taiwan held what could arguably be called
its first democratic national election. That election featured an alternative
political party, the Chinese Social Democratic Party (CSDP) nominating over
50 candidates. The attempt was ultimately unsuccessful and Taiwan’s party
system has remained dominated by the two mainstream parties.3
Although the odds were stacked against such alternative parties, they had
a historic window of opportunity to make a breakthrough in 2016 and thus to
bring greater diversity to Taiwan’s party system. The challenge of smaller par-
ties in 2016 can be seen in a number of features of this campaign. Firstly, a
record eighteen parties contested the proportional party list section of the
parliamentary election. Secondly, the ranks of relevant smaller parties were
no longer limited to parties that had split away from the two mainstream
parties. Moreover, unlike in earlier elections, in 2016 a number of these alter-
native parties mounted serious and well funded campaigns. Previously under
the current electoral system small parties had concentrated their efforts on
the party list contest. In contrast, this time some of the smaller parties were
able to run relevant campaigns in single member districts and even won
three such seats.
In this study we consider how we can best explain the impact of these
small parties in the 2016 election. We are thus interested not only in those
small parties that did make a breakthrough but also why others, despite run-
ning well organized and funded campaigns, were unable to enter parliament.
I. SMALL PARTIES, NEW PARTIES OR NICHE PARTIES?
An initial challenge when examining non-mainstream parties is what is
the most appropriate label to use? Hug defines new parties as “a genuinely
new organization that appoints, for the first time, candidates at a general
election to the system’s representative assembly.”4 Zons suggests that within
the new party category it is analytically important to distinguish between two
sub-types, what he calls “genuinely new parties and splits from existing par-
ties.”5 There are two problems with using the term new parties in the Taiwan
context. The first is that many of the challenger parties are no longer new.
For example, the Green Party Taiwan (GPT) has now been contesting elec-
tions for two decades. Another problem is that one of the most significant
smaller parties over the last two decades is called the New Party (NP), thus
there is much room for confusion. An alternative in the literature is the term
niche parties. These are defined by Tromborg as “political parties that reject
the traditional class-based orientation of politics, appeal to electorate groups
that cross-cut the traditional left-right line of political division, and limit their
2 Christian Schafferer, The Power of the Ballot Box: Political Development and Election Campaign-
ing in Taiwan (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2003); John F. Copper, “The Role of Minor Political
Parties in Taiwan,” World Affairs 155, no. 3 (1993): 95-110.
3 Ching-hsin, Yu, “The Evolving Party System of Taiwan, 1995-2004,” Journal of Asian and
African Studies 40, no. 1-2 (2005): 105-29.
4 Simon Hug, Altering Party Systems: Strategic Behavior and the Emergence of New Political Parties
in Western Democracies (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), 14.
5 Gregor Zons, “The Influence of Programmatic Diversity on the formation of new politi-
cal parties,” Party Politics 21, no6, (2015):  919-929, 919.
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issue appeals to a few issues.”6 This term also has limitations in the Taiwanese
context. Firstly, the left-right distinction has not been useful in Taiwan due to
the lack of a relevant social democratic party. Although some of the parties
contesting the 2016 elections did fulfil the second condition in Tromborg’s
definition, numerous other challenger parties actually offered quite broad
issue appeals. Instead in this paper we follow the example of Spoon in using
the term small parties.7 This allows us to bring into the analysis all the rele-
vant non mainstream parties.
Taiwan’s relevant smaller parties have invariably been splinters from the
two mainstream parties, such as the NP that was created by KMT defectors in
1993.8 These splinter parties have at times won significant vote and seat
shares such as the mid-late mid 1990s and between 2001 and 2005. Such par-
ties largely relied of politicians defecting from the mainstream parties but
also on advocating the core ideological appeals of the mainstream parties. In
other words, Taiwan’s splinter parties neatly fit what Lucardie terms a purifier
party that “clings to an existing ideology, which it feels is diluted or betrayed
by one (or more) of the established parties. Quite often, the founders of this
type of new party were dissident members of an established party which re-
vised its traditional ideology.”9 Not only was the NP made up initially solely of
defectors from the KMT but ideologically its core appeal was that it was the
true protector of the KMT’s values. In contrast, the GPT has advocated a
starkly different ideology from the mainstream parties and almost all its can-
didates have been political novices without electoral experience or main-
stream partisan ties. Thus the GPT party represents what Lucardie terms as a
prophetic party stressing a new ideology and issues that are perceived as being
ignored or neglected by the mainstream parties.10 Overall Taiwan’s pro-
phetic parties have not been competitive and the majority have contested a
single election, and then essentially disappeared from the election scene.
II. EXPLAINING SMALL PARTY IMPACT
A key debate within the small parties literature is how best to explain their
success or failure in electoral politics. One such approach is to focus on insti-
tutional factors, particularly, the electoral system. Such studies build on
Duverger’s classic arguments that a single member district system favours a
two party system, while proportional representation favours a multi-party sys-
tem.11  Since Taiwan adopted a predominantly single member district electo-
6 Mathias Wessel Tromborg, “Space jam: Are niche parties strategic or looney?” Electoral
Studies 40 (2015):189-199, 190; James Adams et al., “Are Niche Parties Fundamentally Different
from Mainstream Parties? The Causes and the Electoral Consequences of Western European
Parties’ Policy Shifts, 1976-1998,” American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 3 (2006): 513-29.
7 Jae-Jae Spoon, Political Survival of Small Parties in West Europe (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 2011).
8 For a discussion of Taiwan’s smaller parties see Dafydd Fell “Success and Failure of New
Parties in Taiwanese Elections.” China: An International Journal, 3 no.2, (2005): 212-239; Dafydd
Fell “Measuring and Explaining the Electoral Fortunes of Small Parties in Taiwan’s Party Polit-
ics.” Issues and Studies. An International Quarterly on China, Taiwan, and East Asian Affairs 50,
no.1, (2014): 153-188.
9 Paul Lucardie, “Prophets, Purifiers and Prolocuters: Towards a Theory on the Emer-
gence of New Parties,” Party Politics 6, no.2 (2000): 176-177.
10 Lucardie, 177. For a discussion of the GPT see Dafydd Fell and Peng Yen-wen (2016),
“The Electoral Fortunes of Taiwan’s Green Party: 1996-2012,” Japanese Journal of Political Science,
17 (1), 63-83.
11 For instance, see Ferdinand Mu¨ller-Rommel ed, New Politics in Western Europe: The Rise
and Success of Green Parties and Alternative Lists (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989).
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ral system in 2005, this institutional approach would predict a squeezing of
space for smaller parties. A second sociological approach links small party
success to the salience of their core issues. Studies have attempted to link the
salience of immigration issues or high levels of unemployment with the rise
of radical right parties and between higher levels of post-materialism and the
strength of ecological parties.12 A further strand in the literature focused on
the role of mainstream parties. For instance, Hug considers the interplay be-
tween established parties and new parties in the context of the emergence of
new salient issues.13 Zons has built in Hug’s earlier work by proposing that
where existing parties present voters with a lower level of programmatic di-
versity then there will be a higher probability of new party formation.14
Meguid on the other hand focuses on the way that mainstream parties deal
with the core issue appeal of niche parties. She argues that where main-
stream parties take adversarial strategies towards niche party issues, the sali-
ence of the issue will rise and this should benefit the niche party’s issue
ownership and electoral performance. In contrast, niche party support will
decrease where mainstream parties take either dismissive or accommodative
strategies towards the niche partycore issue.15
In this paper we apply a comprehensive framework for explaining small
party success proposed by Lucardie. This incorporates elements of a number
of the approaches discussed above. Lucardie explains the impact of small
parties with reference to their political project, resources and the political
opportunity structure.16 In other words, we can understand the prospects for
small parties in the party system by examining: (1) whether small parties of-
fer a political project that addresses issues perceived as important by a signifi-
cant section of the electorate, (2) whether small parties can gain sufficient
human, financial and organizational resources to compete on the electoral
stage, and (3) whether the overall political environment or opportunity struc-
ture is favourable to small party development. Like Spoon, we argue that
small parties’ fates are not entirely determined by the actions of the main-
stream parties.17 Thus if they are able to offer an attractive political project,
defined as a set of policy and ideological appeals, they have a greater chance
of attracting electoral support. The emphasis on resources is particularly im-
portant in Taiwan as campaigning is highly expensive. Smaller parties must
compete against the well funded large parties, the KMT and DPP. In fact the
KMT was until recently described as the richest party in the world.18 Lastly,
even if parties have an attractive set of policies and ample resources; whether
they can have an electoral impact will depend heavily on the political oppor-
tunity structure. This thus would include institutional and sociological vari-
12 On radical right parties see Matt Golder, “Explaining Variation in the Electoral Success
of Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe,” Comparative Political Studies 36, (2003): 432-466.On
the post materialist effect see Iannis Konstantinidis, “The impact of value orientations on elec-
tion outcomes.” Comparative European Politics 9, no. 1, (2011): 38-51.
13 Hug, Altering Party Systems.
14 Zons, “The Influence of Programmatic Diversity on the formation of new political
parties.”
15 Bonnie Meguid, Party competition between Unequals: Strategies and Electoral fortunes in West-
ern Europe (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008).
16 Lucardie, “Prophets, Purifiers and Prolocuters ,”175.
17 Spoon, Political Survival of Small Parties in West Europe.
18 Xu, Dianqing, “The KMT Party’s Enterprises in Taiwan,” Modern Asian Studies, 31 (2)
(1997), 399-413.
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ables discussed earlier, but also important would be variables such as changes
in the popularity of existing parties and the media structure.
III. THE RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL PARTIES IN TAIWAN
As recently as just five years ago a research paper on Taiwan’s smaller
parties could have been deemed a waste of time. Splinter parties had reached
their peak in the first years of the DPP era (2000-2008). However, the intro-
duction of the predominantly single member district electoral system and the
revival of the KMT under Ma Ying-jeou contributed to a long-term period of
small party decline after 2005. Not only did the People First Party (PFP) and
Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) disappear from parliament in 2008, all the
relevant small parties suffered serious seat losses in local council elections
between 2005 and 2010. November 2010 thus represents the nadir for small
parties in Taiwan. In addition to declining electoral support a key factor un-
dermining the smaller parties was large scale defection of politicians into the
large parties the KMT and DPP, between 2006 and 2010.19
The prospects for smaller parties became rosier with the 2012 elections.
That year the PFP and TSU returned to parliament with three seats each.
Although it did not win seats the GPT won 1.7 percent of the party list, com-
ing fifth ahead of the resource rich NP and showing the potential for a non-
splinter  alternative party to enter parliament. The small party revival contin-
ued into the November 2014 local elections. The two main splinter parties,
the PFP and TSU, doubled their councillor numbers up to 9 each. From the
perspective of diversity, this was the first time that multiple alternative parties
had nominated in double figures, with the GPT, Tree Party and People’s
Democratic Front all nominating extensively. Moreover, what was even more
significant was that many of these alternative party politicians were competi-
tive at the local level for the first time, with the GPT winning two seats.
A critical question when examining smaller parties is which parties to in-
clude in the analysis. This is a hotly debated issue in the small party literature.
Janda suggests any legal party gaining over 5 percent in a parliamentary elec-
tion,20 while Rochon’s threshold is any party that has held at least one parlia-
mentary seat.21 At the other end of the spectrum Harmel and Robertson
argue against using these limited thresholds and prefer any registered
party.22 To examine all registered parties or even all eighteen parties con-
testing the party list would leave little space for in-depth analysis. Past experi-
ence from 2008 and 2012 shows also that the majority of non mainstream
parties registering national party lists have not been relevant parties. How-
ever, overly high thresholds on electoral performance would disqualify a
number of potentially relevant smaller parties. Therefore in this study we
followed the example of Fell in examining those parties that gained at least 1
percent of the national vote in parliamentary elections.23 Therefore we bring
the following parties into our analysis: (1) Splinter or purifier parties ex-
amined are the PFP, TSU, NP, the newly formed Republic Party (MKT) and
19 Dafydd Fell, “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Patterns of Party Switching in Multiparty
Taiwan.” Journal of East Asian Studies 14, no.1, (2014): 31-52.
20 Kenneth Janda, Political Parties: A Cross National Survey (New York: Free Press, 1980).
21 Thomas Rochon, “Mobilizers versus Challengers: Towards a Theory of New Party Suc-
cess,” International Political Science Review 6, no. 4 (1985): 419-439.
22 Robert Harmel and John Robertson, “Formation and Success of New Parties,” Interna-
tional Political Science Review 6, no.4, (1985): 501-523, 508.
23 Fell, “Success and Failure of New Parties in Taiwanese Elections.”
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the Chinese Unification Promotion Party (CUPP), (2) Alternative or pro-
phetic parties examined are the Green Party Taiwan Social Democratic Party
Alliance (GPT/SDP), the New Power Party (NPP) and the Faith and Hope
Alliance (FHA).The one party in this list that did not achieve 1 percent was
the CUPP, however, we argue it deserves attention, as it was one of the high-
est spenders on campaign advertising in the election.24
Before starting the analysis of the electoral performance by these smaller
parties, we will briefly introduce those actors that warrant attention. Among
the splinter parties, the NP is the oldest. It was formed in 1993 by defectors
from the KMT and reached its peak in the mid 1990s, winning 12-14 percent
of national seats and votes. However, the party began a long-term process of
decline from 1998, culminating in its virtual elimination from the Legislative
Yuan in 2001. Originally in 2016 the NP had only planned to nominate in two
districts and only decided to nominate a party list late in the campaign. The
PFP was established in 2000 by James Soong after his first presidential cam-
paign, mainly recruiting politicians from the KMT and the NP. It ranks as the
most successful of the splinter parties, winning approximately 15 to 20 per-
cent of votes and seats in 2001 and 2004. At its peak in 2001-2 the PFP
threatened to replace the KMT as the second largest party. It began its clear
decline in 2005, and by 2010 it had almost lost all its elected politicians. It was
able to return to parliament in 2012, winning three seats. In 2016 the PFP
nominated 8 district candidates and also contested the party list. The PFP
and NP tended to cooperate with the KMT and thus are often categorized
broadly as belonging to the Pan Blue camp.
The TSU was established in 2001, recruiting politicians from both the
KMT and DPP. However, since it was allied to the then ruling DPP, it is
viewed as a Pan Green party. Like the PFP, it prospered in the 2001 and 2004
Legislative Yuan elections, winning approximately 5 percent of seats. How-
ever, the TSU also suffered an erosion of seats, votes and politicians after
2005 and lost its Legislative Yuan presence in 2008. The party then surprised
observers by winning almost 9 percent of the party list vote in 2012 and three
legislative seats. In 2016 the TSU only nominated two district candidates and
again concentrated its efforts on the party list. The most recent addition to
the group of splinter parties is the MKT. The party was only established in
2015 by a defecting KMT legislator Hsu Hsin-ying. The party nominated 13
district candidates as well as party list. Given that its founder Hsu is a former
KMT member and it nominated a number of ex-KMT politicians, I have clas-
sified it as a Pan Blue splinter. The final purifier party that actively cam-
paigned in 2016 is the CUPP. Although the party was established in 2005, the
CUPP began to gain greater attention when its leader Chang An-lo led a
group of supporters to protest against the Sunflower occupation in 2014.25
The party nominated 14 district candidates and a party list in 2016. Although
its candidates were not KMT defectors, its open pro unification stance sug-
gests it is best classified as a Pan Blue purifier party.
The list of potentially relevant alternative parties is far shorter. The GPT
was established in 1996. It had a number of competitive candidates and even
won its first National Assembly seat that year. Subsequently, the GPT has con-
sistently nominated candidates at the local and national level, though these
24 Campaign spending by the CUPP is discussed in the section on resources later in the
paper.
25 Alison Hsiao, “White Wolf leads pro-pact rally,” Taipei Times, April 2, 2014,1.
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candidates have generally not been competitive. The party showed its poten-
tial to become a relevant party in the 2012 Legislative Yuan election. After its
local elections breakthrough in 2014 the party contested the 2016 elections
in an electoral alliance with the newly formed SDP. The SDP was established
in 2015 by the sociologist and activist Fan Yun. Together the GPT and SDP
nominated 11 district candidates and a party list. In the aftermath of the
Sunflower movement in 2014 the Citizen’s Union was established with the
objective of creating a new political force more representative of civil society.
However, internal splits led to the separate creation of the SDP and NPP in
early 2015. The NPP’s founders include the academic and Sunflower leader
Huang Kuo-chang and the rock musician Freddie Lim. The party nominated
twelve district candidates and a party list. The majority of SDP, NPP and GPT
candidates are social movement activists without previous ties to the two
mainstream parties. While the GPT, SDP and NPP are all progressive parties
aiming to represent civil society, the final prophetic party offered a contrast-
ingly conservative outlook. The FHA was established in 2015 by former NP
and KMT legislator Joanna Lei together with pastors from a number of evan-
gelical churches. It is widely regarded as a single issue niche party, estab-
lished to prevent the passage of the same sex marriage bill.  The party
nominated 16 district candidates and a party list.
IV. ELECTION POLLS AND RESULTS
TABLE 1: PRE-ELECTION PARTY LIST SURVEYS
TISR TVBS TISR TISR TVBS TVBS
September October November December January 4, January
2015 2015 2015 2015 2016 14, 2016
DPP 35.1 28 37.5 33.8 27 28
KMT 22.1 33 24.9 21.5 25 21
PFP 7.2 3 6.5 6.2 7 6
NPP 0.3 5 3.3 6.1 10 11
NP 0.1 0.5 1.8 4 3
TSU 1.9 3 2.5 2.1 3 2
MKT 2 1.1 1.4 1 1
GPT/SDP 1.4 2 1.4 1.5 2 2
FHA 0.4 1
MCFAP 0.3 0.3 1
NPSU 1.5 1
CUPP
Note: Abbreviation not used elsewhere: MCFAP: Military, Civil Servants, Fire Fighters,
Academics and Police Party, NPSU: Non Partisan Solidarity Union.
Sources: Taiwan Indicator Survey Research (TISR): Taiwan Mood Barometer Survey,
Presidential and Legislative Yuan Election Survey News Release, September 14, 2015;
Taiwan Mood Barometer, General Election and Party List Legislators Survey News Release,
November 27, 2015; Taiwan Mood Barometer Survey, Survey before Polling Ban News
Release, December 31, 2015; TVBS Poll Center: Presidential Survey Two Days Before the
Election, January 14, 2016.
\\jciprod01\productn\J\JCS\23-1\JCS105.txt unknown Seq: 8  9-MAY-16 16:41
48 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF CHINESE STUDIES [Vol. 23:41
TABLE 2: PARTY LIST VOTE SHARES AND SEATS FOR 2012 AND 2016
2012 Party List Party List 2016 Party List Party List
Vote Seats Vote Seats
KMT 44.5 16 26.9 11
DPP 34.6 13 44.1 18
NP 1.5 0 4.1 0
PFP 5.8 2 6.5 3
TSU 9 3 2.5 0
NPP 6.1 2
MKT 1.6 0
GPT/
SDP 1.7 0 2.52 0
FHA 1.69 0
NPSU 0.63 0
CUPP 0.46 0
NHSU 1.24 0 0.41 0
Note: Abbreviations not previously used: NHSU: National Health System Unio
Source: Central Election Commission Database:  http://db.cec.gov.tw/histMain.jsp
TABLE 3: SEAT SHARES IN NATIONAL PARLIAMENTARY
(LEGISLATIVE YUAN) ELECTIONS
1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2008 2012 2016
KMT 59 51.8 54.7 30.2 35.1 71.7 56.6 30
DPP 31.7 32.9 31.1 38.7 39.6 24 35.4 60
NP 12.8 4.9 0.4 0.4 0 0 0
PFP 20.2 15.1 0.9 2.7 2.7
TSU 5.8 5.3 0 2.7 0
NPP 4.4
Source: Central Election Commission Database:  http://db.cec.gov.tw/histMain.jsp
We can get a sense of the campaign and results from Tables 1-3. First
Table 1 shows the pre election party list polls conducted by two survey com-
panies. Naturally the two polling companies have differences in methodology
and TVBS has a reputation for being more pro KMT; however, we can see
some broad patterns of continuity and change in the support levels of the
small parties during the campaign. While the PFP, TSU and GPT/SDP sup-
port levels were quite consistent during the campaign, both the NP and NPP
support rates grew significantly in the months leading up to the election.
When we examine Table 2 which compares the party list vote share and seats
in 2012 with 2016, we can see shows how the market for smaller parties has
increased and also become more competitive. While there were only four
small parties gaining over 1.5 percent in 2012, there were seven such smaller
parties in 2016. However, the number of parties actually winning party lists
seats remained the same, with the NPP replacing the TSU in 2016.
Next Table 3 paints a picture of continuity and change in the actual par-
liamentary composition, showing the party seat shares in Legislative Yuan
elections since democratization. This reveals that the major shift in the bal-
ance of power in 2016 occurred between the two main parties, with the DPP
replacing the KMT as the dominant party and winning its first ever outright
majority. In contrast, despite the growing support for small and especially
alternative parties, the table suggests only a limited increase in parliamentary
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diversity. In other words, only the PFP and NPP were able to pass the 5 per-
cent threshold for party list seats. The NPP entered parliament for the first
time, while the TSU experienced its worst ever vote share at 2.5 and appears
to be even considering dissolving itself.26 Other parties running active and
organized campaigns such as the GPT/SDP alliance, MKT, FHA all fell well
short of the five percent threshold. Despite being one of the highest spend-
ers on advertising, the CUPP only managed to gain 0.46 percent of the vote.
Another party feeling disappointed at the results was the GPT/SDP Alliance.
Despite running a much more organized campaign than 2012 and with seri-
ous district candidates, the party only showed a modest increase from 1.7 to
2.5 percent. Poor results led party chairs/convenors at the GPT, SDP, MKT
and TSU to offer their resignations.
In the next three sections we examine how the small parties’ political
project, political resources and political opportunity structure can explain
their electoral fortunes in 2016.
V. POLITICAL PROJECT
Of all Taiwan’s relevant parties the NP has been the most ideologically
consistent.27 Protecting the Republic of China (ROC) and opposition to Tai-
wan independence have been its constant themes. However, the party be-
came increasingly extreme and narrowly focused from 1998, contributing to
its subsequent electoral decline. In recent years the party has continued this
shift towards the extreme end of the national identity spectrum. The party’s
appeal is clear from its website which describes itself as “the political party for
Chinese” and lists unification as one of its four core appeals.28 In other
words, the NP is both close to the ideological stance of the KMT in the mar-
tial law era, as well as the Chinese nationalist discourse of the PRC. However,
such ideological positions run counter to the trends in public opinion over
the last three decades, such as the sharp decline in support for Chinese unifi-
cation and levels of self identification as Chinese.29 Thus the electoral market
for the NP’s appeals has been drastically reduced in modern Taiwan.
In 2016 the NP’s election appeals included a mix of old and new themes.
For example, a number of pro integration and Chinese identity appeals ap-
peared on some of the NP’s newspaper advertisements such as calling for a
cross-strait peace agreement and opposition to what it termed the “Taiwan
independence curriculum.”30 In addition, it appealed to voters unhappy at
the rise of social protests movements and their causes. For instance, opposi-
tion to lifting the death penalty was raised31 and the NP’s January 2, 2016 TV
ad showed images of protestors outside the Legislative Yuan and then NP
party list candidates appear with Star Wars style lifesavers, promising to “pro-
test righteousness” and to stop the “evil force” from  gaining a majority. This
evil force is named in the numerous newspaper ads placed by the NP’s Chiu
26 Chang Hsiao-ti and Jonathan Chin, “TSU considering disbanding after election losses,”
Taipei Times, Jan 20, 2016, 3.
27 For a detailed discussion of the rise and decline of the NP see: Dafydd Fell, “The Rise
and Decline of the New Party: Ideology, Resources and the Political Opportunity Structure.” East
Asia: An International Quarterly, 23, no.1, (2006): 47-67.
28 http://www.np.org.tw/
29 http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?class=203
30 China Times, Dec 17, 2015, 5.
31 Ibid.
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Yi in national newspapers as the DPP.32 In fact NP ads placed heavy emphasis
on the personality of Chiu Yi who had defected from the KMT after not be-
ing nominated. One ad reminded voters of Chiu’s record of standing up to
the DPP and exposing alleged corruption cases involving Chen Shui-bian and
Tsai in 2012.33 In 2008 and 2012 the NP had tried a similar purifier appeal;
however the KMT’s ideological shifts and closer ties to the PRC had squeezed
the space for the NP. In contrast, with the KMT’s replacement of its pro
unification presidential candidate Hung Hsiu-chu, the NP was able to win
over defectors with its traditional Chinese identity appeals.
Although the PFP is also a KMT splinter party, it has tended to take
vaguer ideological and policy stances than the NP. In other words, though it
has often used appeals such as protecting the ROC, it has largely steered
clear of the unification appeals adopted by the NP. It proposes setting aside
the unification versus independence dispute and insists that any future
changes to Taiwan’s status need the approval of the Taiwanese people.34 In-
stead the primary appeal of the party has been to focus on the charisma and
government ability of its chairman James Soong. The fact that Soong again
mounted a presidential campaign offered a similar boost to the PFP’s legisla-
tive party list. While in the DPP era the PFP was a close ally of the KMT, since
2011, a central PFP appeal has been to attack the Ma Ying-jeou led govern-
ment. PFP politicians such as Liu Wen-hsiung have been regular participants
in politics TV call in shows joining pro DPP pundits in attacking the KMT
government’s performance. In 2016, as in 2012, the PFP stressed that it stood
for the ending of Blue Green conflict and even called itself a “third force.”35
The political platform adopted by the newly established MKT appeared
quite similar to the PFP. Its selection of the ROC emblem (with a yellow
background) as its party badge is further evidence it should be regarded as a
Pan Blue party. At the party’s opening ceremony the party flag and ROC flag
were placed to the left and right of a portrait of Sun Yat Sen. The similarly
moderate positioning compared with the PFP on the national identity spec-
trum can be seen in its first few lines of its party song, “Republic of China
Republican Party, Love the People, Love Taiwan.”36 Nevertheless, like the
PFP, the MKT was trying to convince voters that it is above the Blue Green
divide. Thus it invited major politicians from the KMT, DPP, and PFP to give
speeches at the party’s founding ceremony. Lastly, like the PFP, the MKT’s
appeal was heavily concentrated on its leader, thus chairwoman Hsu Hsin-
ying featured prominently in party propaganda. Nevertheless, the MKT faced
the problem that its appeals offered little that distinguished itself from the
PFP and its presidential alliance further blurred those boundaries.
The appearance of the CUPP was one of the most interesting elements of
the 2016 election. While the KMT attempted to tone down its pro China
image, the CUPP took an explicitly pro unification and pro PRC line. In
numerous newspaper ads the CUPP openly advocated the PRC unification
model of one country two systems. One such ad noted that, “Many friends
that care about the CUPP have told us for the sake of votes do not emphasize
the word unification; otherwise you will be labelled red. However, the red
proposal for peaceful unification, one country two systems, is the best guar-
32 United Daily News, Jan 4, 2016, A1.
33 China Times, Jan 13, 2016, A7.
34 http://www.pfp.org.tw/Party_Show.asp?id=3
35 Liberty Times, Jan 10, 2016, B5.
36 https://www.mkt.org.tw/Home
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antee for the wellbeing of Taiwan’s people.”37 The party’s TV and newspaper
ads also placed heavy emphasis on the image party leader Chang An-lo and
how he would balance out or control the DPP in parliament.38 Nevertheless,
the party’s poor results reveal the limits of PRC unification appeals to the
Taiwanese electorate.
The Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) had been the relevant party to the
left of the DPP on the national identity spectrum since the early 2000s. It has
tended to concentrate on opposing economic and political integration with
China. Like the PFP, it has also relied heavily on the charisma of its de facto
leader, Lee Teng-hui. He has tended to be prominently featured in the
party’s propaganda and played an important role in the party’s fine perform-
ance in 2012. However, like the PFP, the TSU is vulnerable to the fluctua-
tions in the popularity of its ageing leader. In 2016 the TSU used similar anti
China appeals to earlier elections. For example, one of its TV ads showed a
university student throwing the book Formosa Betrayed at President Ma and as
he was being held to the ground by security agents shouting “Taiwan and
China one country on each side.” Lee did appear on some of the party’s ads;
however, he did not campaign as actively for the party as in previous
elections.39
Globally environmental parties face the challenge of being labelled as sin-
gle issue parties. This naturally also applies to the GPT. The party has, how-
ever, benefitted from the high salience of a number of environmental issues
over the last decade, in particular the controversy over the Fourth Nuclear
Power Station. This salience was increased in the aftermath of the Fukushima
nuclear disaster in Japan in 2011. However, like ecological parties in Western
Europe, the GPT has sought to broaden its appeal by addressing a range of
alternative issue appeals.40 For example, its activists have played prominent
roles in a number of disputes that link environmental issues with land justice,
such as the controversial Miramar resort project in Taitung. More impor-
tantly, the party has branded itself as a spokesperson for civil society, some-
thing particularly important given the growing strength of civil society since
the KMT returned to power in 2008. Thus the majority of GPT/SDP candi-
dates had rich experience as social movement activists. One particularly nota-
ble appeal has been over gay and lesbian rights, an issue on which the
mainstream parties have tended to either ignore or take divided or ambigu-
ous stances on. The GPT was the first party to nominate openly gay candi-
dates in local and national elections. This emphasis was also apparent in the
nomination of Hsu Hsiu-wen, a leading figure in the Taiwan Partners Rights
Promotion Alliance on its party list. Another noteworthy element in the
GPT’s attempt to reach new voters has been to focus on labour related issues.
The nomination of Chang Li-fen, the Secretary General of the China
Telecom Union, at the top of its party list signified this new approach. A final
element to the GPT/SDP’s appeals was how it attempted to avoid any open
cooperation with the DPP. In 2012 there was informal cooperation between a
GPT candidate and the DPP, something which created bitter disputes within
the party. Four years later, the GPT/SDP made keeping its distance from the
DPP part of its appeal.
37 China Times, Dec 25, 2015, A1.
38 China Times, Dec 30, 2015, A1.
39 Liberty Times, Jan 15, 2016, A3.
40 Dan Houghton, “Small but perfectly formed? The Rise and Rise of Germany’s Smaller
Parties,” German Politics 20, no.1, (2011): 186-199.
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The key themes for the party in 2016 were visible in its Change TV ad.41
We first see images of before and after at the Miramar Resort, then before
and after the TaPu land dispute case, we are reminded of the growing gap
between GDP and wages, images of melamine milk to remind voters about
food safety scandals, and its ends with the image of a couple kissing at a
lesbian wedding ceremony. In short, the GPT/SDP attempted to play the
role of a genuinely alternative party in its political project. The fact the party
failed to reach five percent shows the challenges of such an alternative politi-
cal project strategy.
The political project of the NPP had overlap with both the TSU and the
GPT/SDP. While the GPT has tended to steer clear of directly engaging in
the unification versus independence debates, the NPP adopted a position to
the left of the DPP. Among the NPP’s three basic advocacies, the first is, “The
NPP advocates normalizing the country’s status.”42 Thus the party was com-
peting for voters supporting independence with the TSU. Like the GPT, the
NPP also markets itself as the representative of the new Taiwanese civil soci-
ety. Party founder and district candidate Huang Kuo-chang was one of the
three most prominent leaders of the Sunflower movement. An examination
of the NPP’s party list TV advertisement reveals the mixed appeals adopted
by the party. The ad showed images of its candidates and supporters at a
variety of protests such as the Sunflower occupation, anti nuclear demonstra-
tions, protesting against the Ma-Xi meeting and gay pride parades. Another
key feature in the ad was images of youth. Film directors Ke Yi-cheng and Wu
Nian-chen explain the importance of youth entering parliament. NPP candi-
date Freddie Lim explains how they will help the DPP gain a majority but also
supervise the DPP in government. And towards the end of the ad we see a
rally scene showing the NPP’s Huang with Tsai Ing-wen. Thus a major differ-
ence between the GPT/SDP and the NPP was that the latter had a closer
working relationship with the DPP. For instance, the parties cooperated in a
number of districts, with the DPP leaving three districts for the NPP to stand
against the KMT and the NPP strongly backed the DPP’s presidential candi-
date Tsai Ing-wen. In other words, while the political platform of the GPT/
SDP was clearly that of an alternative party, the NPP’s includes elements of
both an alternative and a Pan Green party. The election results suggest that
the NPP’s hybrid approach was more effective than those of both the GPT
and TSU.
VI. POLITICAL RESOURCES
Taiwanese elections are extremely expensive and thus having sufficient
resources to mount effective campaigns is a critical challenge to all parties.
High candidate and party deposits, together with high levels of spending by
mainstream parties place a severe strain on the meagre finances of smaller
parties. One such example is the free market in political advertising, espe-
cially television advertising, which is one of the largest spending items in na-
tional elections. In this area small parties are unable to compete and thus are
comparatively invisible in the mainstream media. In this section we particu-
larly focus on the financial, human and organizational resources available to
the relevant smaller parties.
41 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C9z6iaXqNao
42 https://www.newpowerparty.tw/proposal
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Comparatively the splinter parties have had greater ability to raise funds
for campaigning. For instance, with a former president as its spiritual leader
the TSU has been able to raise funds. The same applies for the PFP with
Soong and a number of former legislators. Because the TSU and PFP both
won legislative seats in 2012 on the party list they were also able to benefit
from state funding subsidies, something not available to the NP.
The challenge of fund raising has been far more severe for the alternative
parties. Finding money for candidate deposits and disputes over how to
spend money has plagued the GPT throughout its history.43 Since the GPT
candidates usually did not gain enough votes to recover their deposits, the
party and even candidates often went bankrupt after an election. Part of the
reason that the GPT/SDP and NPP have become competitive relevant parties
in 2016 is that they have managed to develop innovative approaches to gener-
ate limited but more effective fund raising.
TABLE 4: CAMPAIGN SPENDING ITEMS IN 2015-16
Newspaper ads
Spending in 2015-16 Dec 16 2015-
(unit 1,000 NT$) January 15 2016 TV ads
NP 14,730 4 4
PFP 7,774 14 10
TSU 7,186 4 20
CUPP 12,578 16 5
NPSU 4,757 7 5
NPP 3,013 1 1
MKT 9,602 3 18
FHA 4,334 0 2
GPT/SDP 149 0 0
Note 1: The campaign spending column lists party campaign spending
estimates for all major cable and terrestrial TV stations, daily newspaper,
radio and magazine advertising between January 2015 and voting day on
January 16, 2016. This does not include internet campaigning. It also does
not include presidential campaign spending or advertisements purchased by
individual candidates. Data supplied by the advertising analysis company
Rainmaker XKM. For more information on Rainmaker XKM see http://
www.xkm.com.tw/index_en.asp
Note 2: The second column lists the number of advertisements placed by the
smaller parties between December 16, 2015 and January 15, 2016 in the
United Daily News, China Times and Liberty Times. It also does not include
presidential campaign spending or advertisements purchased by individual
candidates. This was based on the author’s collection of newspaper
advertisements.
Note 3: The TV ads column represents the number of different ads
purchased by the political parties in the one year prior to voting day. This
does not include presidential or candidate ads and also does not include
advertisements distributed solely on social media. Data supplied by
Rainmaker XKM.
43 Fell and Peng “The Electoral Fortunes of Taiwan’s Green Party,”63-83.
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We can get a sense of how well funded the smaller parties were from their
campaign spending on advertising. Table 4 shows small party advertising
spending in the campaign, the number of purchased newspaper ads in the
month leading up to voting day and the number of separate TV advertise-
ments placed by small parties. This data can tell us a few things related to
campaign resources. Firstly, many of the small parties were much better
funded than previous elections. In fact during 2015 the CUPP was the second
highest spending party on advertising, only beaten by the KMT. The CUPP
bought the highest number of newspaper advertisements. In addition, the
TSU, PFP, MKT, NP all spent large amounts on TV and newspaper advertis-
ing. In fact, the candidate that bought the most newspaper ads was NP candi-
date Chiu Yi, with 20 ads in three national dailies. Overall the Pan Blue
splinter parties spent much more than Pan Green or alternative parties. The
party type largely absent from this table is the alternative parties such as the
GPT and NPP. The NPP bought a single TV and a newspaper ad on the eve
of the election, while the GPT/SDP Alliance was almost completely absent in
traditional media advertising.44 In fact both parties relied more heavily on
distributing their ads via social media rather than buying paid advertising.
The GPT’s campaign spending was much higher than in 2012 but this was
limited to flyers, personnel costs and bus advertisements. Another lesson
from comparing Tables 4 and 2 is that there is not a direct relationship be-
tween campaign spending and actual vote share. The NP and CUPP were by
far the highest spending small parties on advertising but both failed to win
any seats. The ratio of advertising spending and votes gained was especially
poor for the CUPP, which was one of the lowest voter getters of all at 0.46
percent. Similar examples of expensive but failed campaign spending were
the cases of the TSU, MKT and the FHA. In contrast, the NPP and GPT
reveal the potential of campaigning using non traditional campaign
advertising.
A closely related resource challenge for small parties is human resources;
this is partly because politicians with rich election and government experi-
ence tend to be the most effective fund raisers. A critical reason why the
splinter parties have performed better electorally has been their richer
human resources. However, after the introduction of the new electoral sys-
tem, human resources also became a serious problem for the splinter parties.
The NP, PFP and TSU suffered a serious loss of electable politicians defect-
ing (back) to the mainstream parties. Although the TSU and PFP recovered
sufficiently to re-enter the Legislative Yuan in 2012, a lack of candidates that
can be competitive at the district level has been a common problem for both
parties. The TSU has been a party that has always lacked stars. Despite its
legislators being in office during the second Ma term, none of them were
able to become household names. This human resource problem for the
TSU was visible in the fact that its district candidates performed very poorly
in 2016. The PFP has been more successful at holding on and at times even
receiving KMT defectors back such as Chang Shuo-wen in New Taipei City.
Nevertheless, even where the DPP encouraged its supporters to vote for the
PFP candidate in Taipei City District 4, Huang Shan-shan was unable to de-
feat the KMT candidate.
44 The only exception was limited purchasing of radio advertising in the run up to the
election.
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Given that statistically standing for an alternative party has invariably led
to failure and may well bankrupt a candidate, it is not surprising that such
parties have struggled to find candidates to stand at the district level. Former
GPT leaders have often complained about the difficulty of finding candidates
and also last minute nominations.45 However, we can see some improvement
on the issue of human resources in the case of the two alternative parties in
2016. Although the GPT/SDP district candidates generally knew they were
unlikely to win election this time, they began their campaigns much earlier
than in 2012. They ran much more serious campaigns than earlier district
candidates and were much more competitive than in 2012. Thus it was sur-
prising to see that these strong district GP/SDP Alliance campaigns did not
have a larger positive knock on effect on the party list vote.
Human resources were an area where the NPP had a major advantage
over the GPT/SDP. Unlike earlier alternative parties, the NPP managed to
attract a number of stars that allowed it to be competitive in district races.
Figures such as Freddie Lim, Hsu Yung-ming, Neil Peng and Huang Kuo-
chang are all household names. The NPP’s nomination of such stars partly
explains why it was more competitive than other smaller parties such as the
TSU, PFP and GPT in district races, even where the DPP did not nominate.
Beyond electoral politicians a key resource is party activists and party
members. In the mid 1980s the KMT claimed to have well over 2 million
members, equivalent to almost twenty percent of the adult population at the
time.46 One of the weaknesses of the splinter parties is that they have tended
to be elite parties based around a group of politicians that defected from
mainstream parties. They did not generally develop mass party membership
structures, thus when splinter politicians defected back to the mainstream
parties, their supporters followed. This weak grassroots base remains a seri-
ous weakness for the three main splinter parties. Thus one of the most inter-
esting developments in 2015-16 was the rapid membership recruitment drive
of the MKT after its formation. One report claimed it has already had well
over 100,000 members by June 2015 and was thus the third largest party
based on membership. Its chair claimed that it aimed to take over the two
largest parties to become the largest in membership numbers.47 Neverthe-
less, the MKT’s eventual poor election results raise doubts about the effec-
tiveness of the party’s membership drive and the reliability of its membership
claims.
A final and again related element when it comes to resources is organiza-
tional resources. Once again the smaller parties were at a severe disadvan-
tage. Even at their peak in popularity the splinter parties were much stronger
at the national than local level. This meant that they struggled to develop
local party organizations outside of Taipei. The limited revival of the splinter
parties in 2012 and 2014 did not really change this organizational weakness.
The alternative parties were even weaker organizationally and could perhaps
in the past have been described as lacking any substantive organization. For-
mer GPT Convenor Chen Man-li complained about the party suffering from
loose organization.48 The GPT only started to develop tighter organization
after Li Gen-cheng became co-convenor in 2013. Key features include a more
45 For example see Fell and Peng, “The Electoral Fortunes of Taiwan’s Green Party,” 77.
46 Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition, (Taipei: SMC Publishing, 1989): 85-86.
47 Fang Bing-chao, “Aiming to exceed the second largest party, the MKT will nominate a
presidential candidate,” Storm Media, June 23, 2015, http://www.storm.mg/article/54329
48 Interview with author in Taipe, December 20, 2012.
\\jciprod01\productn\J\JCS\23-1\JCS105.txt unknown Seq: 16  9-MAY-16 16:41
56 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF CHINESE STUDIES [Vol. 23:41
institutionalised nomination system and the creation of active local party
branches. One such feature was the attempt by the GPT to establish a Labour
Branch and to gain endorsement from a large number of labour unions. One
former GPT leader commented that this was the first time the GPT has had
an organizational vote base.49 However, the GPT’s limited vote increase also
raises question marks over the reliability of its new organizational model to
translate into votes.
VII. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE
We can understand the overall political environment facing smaller par-
ties through a number of dimensions. The first place to look is naturally the
electoral system. The 2008 election revealed the devastating effect of the new
predominantly single member district system on the small parties. As the
smaller parties either gave up or became uncompetitive in single member
districts, they also failed to reach the required five percent for the party list
seats. However, if the electoral system was the key determinant of small party
impact then we would not have expected to see small parties revive under the
current system in 2012 and continue to increase their numbers in 2016. This
shows that the electoral system cannot explain everything. In fact the results
show that even if the threshold had been lowered to 3 percent as proposed
earlier in 2015, the only other party that would have crossed the threshold to
enter parliament was the NP. In fact parties such as the GPT have found it
much easier to develop national campaigns focused on the party list than
under the old multiple member district electoral system.
Since the alternative parties draw so many of their candidates from social
movements, the growing strength of civil society over the last six years should
have offered greater space for alternative parties such as the GPT/SDP and
NPP. The advertisements discussed earlier revealed how both the NPP and
GPT attempted to take advantage of this wave of social movement activism.
To use Meguid’s terminology, the KMT, NP and CUPP all took highly adver-
sarial stances towards social movements, with numerous anti Sunflower refer-
ences in their advertising.50 However, the DPP also attempted to defuse this
appeal by co-opting such appeals both through its election propaganda and
nomination. In other words, the DPP adopted an accommodative approach
to the niche parties’ appeal. For instance, the DPP nominated record num-
bers of civil society activists. Particularly noteworthy was its nomination of
three former GPT party candidates on the DPP’s party list and two of these
were former GPT convenors.51
The overall party system can offer opportunities and constraints on
smaller parties. The key variable in 2016 was how despite the market for small
parties increasing, the competition for such voters was much more intensive.
For example, the following parties competed for voters disatisfied with the
KMT: NP, CUPP, MKT, PFP and to a lesser extent the FHA, while back in
2012 there had been only two such parties. Back in 2012 the GPT was the
only alternative party, but in 2016 its space was squeezed by the arrival of the
NPP and to a lesser extent the Tree Party formed by defectors from the GPT.
The TSU faced a similar challenge as it now needed to compete not only with
49 Interview by author, Peng Yen-wen, Kaohsiung, January 9, 2016.
50 For example see the KMT’s I’m the Fifth generation TV ad: https://www.facebook.com/
mykmt/videos/vb.131181017972/10153800594912973/?type=2&theater
51 The former GPT Convenors nominated by the DPP were Chen Man-li and Yu Wan-ju.
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a revitalised DPP but also the newly formed NPP, and also two minor pro
independence parties. Thus even though the proportion of party list votes
going to small parties increased in 2016, the actual number of seats they
gained in the party list remained the same as in 2012.
Another important element of the political environment has been the
willingness of main parties and smaller parties to work in alliance. While such
alliances were very rare in 2008 and 2012, there were numerous cases in
2016. However, the results in 2016 were quite mixed. The NPP was successful
in all three districts where the DPP allowed it to stand alone against the KMT.
However, where the DPP stood aside for the TSU, PFP and GP/SDP alliance
and where the KMT stood aside for the NP, all four cases were unsuccessful.
Past experience has shown the risks for small parties of working too closely
with mainstream parties, as this contributed to the demise of the smaller par-
ties in the period 2005-2008. The dangers were again revealed when the NPP
lost significant numbers of its originally predicted voters. For example, in the
final week of the election campaign the DPP issued a large number of TV
and newspaper ads that called for voters concentrate their party list vote on
the DPP. The fact that these ads tended to focus on DPP candidates with
social movement backgrounds made it clear to voters that the party was trying
to dissuade them from splitting their votes for small allied parties such as the
NPP.52
A final relevant element of the political opportunity structure has been
technological changes. The growing use of internet and social media
campaigning have played a critical role in allowing smaller parties to reduce
their campaigning costs. The potential for using new media as an alternative
to traditional media was shown in the 2014 Taipei mayoral election where the
independent candidate Ko Wen-je was able to win election despite only mini-
mal use of traditional TV and newspaper advertising against a heavy spending
KMT rival. Naturally the large parties have also invested heavily in internet
campaigning, however, 2016 again revealed the degree that social media has
enabled the alternative parties to broaden their propaganda reach. Both the
NPP and GPT had only minimal traditional advertising spending and relied
very heavily on social media in 2016 but they were able to vastly outperform
the big spenders among the splinter parties.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this study we have applied the framework proposed by Lucardie to
explain the impact of small parties in Taiwan’s 2016 elections. In other
words, we examined the small parties’ political project, resources and politi-
cal opportunity structure to understand their electoral fortunes. We can see
this in the contrasting electoral results achieved by the NPP compared with
the GPT/SDP. The two both used similar progressive appeals and aimed to
profit from the rise of Taiwan’s social movements. However, the NPP’s na-
tional identity appeals, richer human resources and alliance with the DPP
gave it a clear advantage over its alternative rival.
What are the future prospects for Taiwan’s smaller parties in the near
future? Much will depend on how well the NPP and PFP perform in this new
DPP era. The next electoral tests will be the 2018 local elections and then the
2020 national elections. It is likely that the small party options for voters will
52 For example see DPP ad, Liberty Times, January 8, 2016, A1.
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again be quite different from 2016. Some parties like the MKT are likely to
disappear. The traditional splinter parties are also likely to face a struggle to
survive. For instance, with Soong unlikely to mount another presidential cam-
paign, the PFP may struggle to pass the 5 percent threshold.
The new party system will naturally be affected by how the KMT copes
with this setback. One DPP campaigner even suggested that the KMT will be
replaced by the NPP as the second largest party.53 This seems over optimistic.
It does however seem unlikely that any of the KMT splinter parties will be
able to replace the KMT, as the PFP threatened to do in 2001. Much will
depend on who wins the post election power struggle within the KMT. If for
instance Hung Hsiu-chu wins the KMT power struggle and continues the ap-
peals used while she was KMT presidential candidate, then it is quite possible
the party could split again or at least see large scale defections.
A final question for the future is whether a genuine alternative party can
be competitive in Taiwan’s party system. The NPP represents a hybrid party,
with both alternative and splinter party features and it thus remains to be
seen which features are dominant in its operation during this parliamentary
term. The GPT/SDP alliance 2016 campaign revealed the possibilities and
challenges for a genuine alternative party.
53 Interview by author, Kaohsiung, December 23, 2015.
